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ABSTRACT 
All knowledge is context dependent. The relevant context is the social community where 
it resides, i.e. the ‘epistemic community’ formed as groups of people define and legitimize 
the knowledge they possess. In the mutual engagement in a common enterprise, epistemic 
communities develop, maintain and nurture the codes, tools and theories that provide the 
basis of their practice. Commonalities of code, tools and theory facilitate both voluntary 
transfer and involuntary imitation of knowledge within communities, also ones spanning 
organizational boundaries. Conversely, knowledge transfer between different epistemic 
communities, whether desired or unintended, is often cumbersome and fraught with 
difficulties. In order to achieve effective integration and cooperation between its various 
professional communities and subcultures, firms must therefore undertake investments in 
boundary-spanning mechanisms. Since these investments are specific to the context in 
which they take place and to the transactions that they enable, they cannot easily be 
organized through arm’s length contracts. Firms exist because they have a relative 
advantage over markets in the integration of diverse knowledge. However, the associated 
capabilities need not translate into a relative advantage also in the transfer of knowledge, 
i.e. knowledge exchanged between members of the same epistemic community. Within 
communities, knowledge disseminates with relative ease both intentionally and through 
emulation. Knowledge thus acquired can generally be applied also outside the context of 
the exchange and the effort or investment expended in its acquisition is not transaction 
specific. The governance mode applied in such exchanges is therefore determined by 
strategic and contextual factors, including those of traditional transaction cost logic.    
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION    
The activities of most firms require the mobilization and coordination of specialized and 
diverse expertise. However, the integration of specialized competences does not come 
about easily and will typically not be achieved unless requisite ‘integrating devices’ are 
in place (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Recent research on the coordination and 
integration of the expert knowledge of diverse occupational groups has thrown new light 
on this and related issues. 
 
Dougherty’s (1992) studies of new product development teams illustrate the problems 
that occur when key participants from different ‘thought worlds’ fail to mutually take into 
account their varying interpretations of technological and market possibilities:  
A thought world is a community of persons engaged in a certain domain of activ-
ity who have a shared understanding about that activity…. Thought worlds with 
different funds of knowledge cannot easily share ideas, and may view one 
another’s central issues as esoteric, if not meaningless. (Dougherty, 1992, p. 182) 
This does not imply that members of different communities must reach agreement on all 
relevant interpretations of particular facts, proposed decisions or lines of action. Through 
communication, diverse groups can reach ‘equifinal meaning’ and be able to undertake 
common action in spite of different motivations and in spite of different interpretations of 
potential outcomes (Donellon, Gray and Bougon, 1986). Recently, detailed ethnographic 
studies by Carlile (2002) and Bechky (2003a, 2003b) have elucidated the mechanisms 
and processes whereby people from different occupational backgrounds manage to effec-
tively communicate across the boundaries of their respective ‘thought worlds’ – without 
sacrificing the integrity of either. These studies provide empirical evidence on the 
processes of ‘perspective making and perspective taking’ (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995) 
that are necessary for the integration of diverse practices and cognitive traditions in the 
day-to-day operation of firms and other organizations (Grant, 1996a, 1996b).  
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This paper outlines some important implications of the perspective that these recent 
studies invite. First, they are clearly incommensurable with a unitary concept of the firm 
and the knowledge at its disposal, suggesting instead, as Grant (1996a, 1996b) has 
powerfully argued, a view of the firm as “…an institution for integrating knowledge.” 
They thereby put into question the meaning of common metaphors, such as those of 
‘organizational knowledge’ and ‘organizational learning’, emphasizing instead the 
contextual nature of knowledge, i.e. its embeddedness in the practice of specialized 
communities. Second, they call for a redefinition of concepts such as ‘knowledge’, 
‘knowledge transfer’ and ‘knowledge integration’, all of which are central to whole range 
of theories and conceptualizations of firms and their activities.  
 
The following discussion is based on the premise that knowledge cannot be meaningfully 
defined without reference to the group of people (‘epistemic community’) where it has 
been created and resides. As stated by Brown and Duguid (1991, p. 53), “… it is the 
organization’s communities at all levels, who are in contact with the environment and 
involved in the interpretative sense making, congruence finding and adapting. It is from 
any site of such interactions that new insights can be co-produced.” The first section of 
the paper proposes a model of three interacting knowledge elements – codes, theory and 
tools – that together can be used to describe the content and evolution of a community’s 
knowledge.  
 
The paper thereafter outlines some implications of the proposed model both for the 
theory of the firm and for the significance of knowledge in the resource-based view of 
strategy (RBV). It proceeds on the observation that the problems associated with the inte-
gration of specialized knowledge are different from the ones encountered when transfer-
ring knowledge within epistemic communities. The distinction reflects significant 
differences in the transaction costs associated with the exchange and exploitation of 
knowledge and has, therefore, fundamental implications for the selection of governance 
modes for such transactions. It has also implications for the imitability and substitutabil-
ity of different kinds of knowledge assets, central concerns in the resource based view of 
strategy.  
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 EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES    
The argument outlined in the following pages is premised on the conviction that all 
knowledge is socially constructed and context dependent. The knowledge context is 
defined by the social community where it resides.1 Knowledge that is recognized as 
relevant and useful in one context may be totally meaningless in another.  
Within communities, producing, warranting, and propagating knowledge are 
almost indivisible. Between communities, as these get teased apart, division 
becomes prominent and problematic. Hence, the knowledge produced doesn’t 
readily turn into something with exchange value or use value elsewhere. (Brown 
and Duguid 1998, p. 99) 
Accepting – without going into the underlying epistemological assumptions – Plato’s 
classical definition of ‘knowledge’ as ‘justified true belief’2, I shall assume that knowl-
edge obtains economic significance through application in the performance of an eco-
nomically meaningful activity, i.e. the exercise of a skill that it informs. When engaging 
in a common enterprise, groups of people develop, maintain and nurture the knowledge 
informing the skills of their practice. The framework outlined below therefore focuses on 
communities of practitioners, as the locus of both creation and exploitation of knowledge 
(Lave and Wenger 1991; Brown and Duguid 1991, 1998, 2001a, 2001b). 
 
Through its practice, a community develops a shared understanding of what it does, the 
means and methods it employs, the standards by which its activity is judged, and how it 
relates to other communities and their practices – in all a ‘world view’ (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991). This understanding comprises the community’s collective epistemic base 
(Mokyr, 2002). The processes of developing the knowledge base and the formation of the 
community itself are significantly interdependent: the practice develops the 
understanding, which can reciprocally change the community’s practice and their 
members’ view of themselves (Brown and Duguid 1998, p. 96).  
 
                                                 
1 The minimum community size is two; there are forms of knowledge that only lovers share and can 
appreciate. Other kinds of knowledge seem so universal that they are probably shared by all human beings. 
Most types of knowledge relevant in managerial practice and for economic theory – the types that this 
paper attempts to address – lie in between these two extremes. 
2 Plato’s definition is not unproblematic (c.f. Gettier 1963) but will have to do for the present purpose. 
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Membership in a community is obtained through the acquisition of its skills through 
formal training, apprenticeship or in other types of situated learning processes, such as 
those described by Lave and Wenger (1991) as ‘legitimate peripheral learning’. Some-
times, communities recognize acceptance of new members through formal rites-de-
passage: graduation ceremonies, the awards of master craftsmen’s ensigns, or the 
granting of legal privileges to practice a trade; sometimes, recognition is more gradual, 
based, for example, on the number and quality of someone’s publications in peer-
reviewed journals or other tokens of ability to meet the community’s performance 
standards.       
 
In Wenger’s (1998) analysis of insurance claims processors or Orr’s (1996) studies of 
service technicians, small work groups or functional departments are seen as forming 
individual ‘communities of practice’, individuals mutually bound by their engagement in 
a common enterprise and mastering a shared repertoire of skills (Lave and Wenger, 1991; 
Brown and Duguid, 1991, 1998; Wenger, 1998). Mutual engagement requires interaction 
and is therefore favored by geographical proximity. Many epistemic communities 
therefore cluster in specific regions, where the acquisition of their skills is favored by the 
presence of organizations providing appropriate learning opportunities (Håkanson, 2004). 
Examples include the engineers developing the technologies underlying the flat panel 
display industry (Murtha et al. 2001) or the communities concentrated in Silicon Valley 
(Brown and Duguid 2002; Saxenian 1996).  
 
However, once the skills of the community have been acquired, mutual engagement does 
not necessarily require face-to-face interaction but can – “given the right context” – take 
place over the phone, by email or over the radio (Wenger 1998, p. 74). Indeed, most 
professional communities extend beyond individual organizations and localities. ‘Nor-
mative isomorphism’ through selection, socialization and vocational training leads to a 
professional… 
… pool of almost interchangeable individuals who occupy similar positions 
across a range of organizations and possess a similarity of orientation and dispo-
sition that may override variations in tradition and control that might otherwise 
shape organizational behavior. (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 152) 
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 Professional communities that span organizational boundaries create and legitimize 
common codes and cognitive frames. In the past, national borders often delimited com-
munities and their practices (Kogut, 1991), but even before the advent of jet air travel and 
electronic communication geographical boundaries were not always important. Scientists, 
for example, have long formed loose but geographically extensive communities (Knorr-
Cetina 1999). Common pursuit of a shared scientific practice allows their members to 
communicate and collaborate over large distances, without necessarily having close or 
frequent personal contact. 
 
The semantic conventions in the inherited literature are ambiguous and it is useful, as 
Brown and Duguid (2001b) suggest, to distinguish such larger communities from the 
smaller work groups for which the term ‘community of practice’ was originally coined.3 
Following recent usage (Steinmueller 2000; Cowan et al. 2000; Edwards 2001), I propose 
to use the term ‘epistemic community‘ to denote groups of people mastering the tools, 
codes and theories of a common practice regardless of their geographical location and the 
intensity of mutual contact that they may maintain.4 The expression ‘community of 
practice’ will be used to signify groups, such as the functional departments of business 
                                                 
3 Dougherty, following Douglas’ (1987) retranslation of Fleck’s (1935/1979) ‘Denkkollektiv’ (‘thought-
collective’), uses the term ‘thought worlds’ to denote the beliefs and perceptions common to members of 
functional departments. Boland and Tenkasi (1995) use the phrase ‘communities of knowing’, Bechky 
(2003a; 2003b) prefers ‘occupational communities’ while Grant (1996) and Carlile (2002) discuss ‘expert 
knowledge’ primarily in terms of business functions. Quoting the works of Strauss (1978, 1982, 1984) on 
‘social worlds’, Knorr Cetina (1999) on ‘epistemic cultures’ and Ziman (1967) on ‘public knowledge’ in 
scientific communities, Brown and Duguid (2001b, p. 205) propose the term ‘networks of practice.’ The 
latter term has the advantage of emphasizing the instrumental aspects of knowledge: ‘networks of practice’, 
like ‘communities of practice’ develop over time in the common pursuit of a shared enterprise; they exist 
because they have a task to accomplish. On the other hand – as the authors note – the reference to 
‘networks’ is potentially misleading in that it implies a certain regularity of contact that need not apply. 
4 According to Amin and Cohendet (2004, p. 74 ff.), the concept was first introduced by Knorr Cetina 
(1981) to denote groups of people involved in the deliberate production of knowledge, for example 
scientists in a particular field or the engineers of an R&D laboratory. It has also been employed in the field 
of international relations to denote communities whose members (1) share a common set of values and 
beliefs, (2) have common theoretical understanding regarding causalities regarding policy measures and 
desired outcomes, (3) have shared criteria for validity, and (4) pursue the same policy enterprise (Haas, 
1992).       
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firms, pursuing common goals through common practices that involving more or less 
regular personal interaction.5  
 
Epistemic Communities as Interpretation Systems 
Epistemic communities form ‘interpretation systems’ (Daft and Weick 1984). They exist 
in order to help their members interpret the world and provide meaning to their activities. 
Their ‘practice’ is always (negotiated) social practice and includes both explicit and tacit 
components (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger 1998). Epistemic communities are where 
knowledge resides and articulation and knowledge creation can take place.  
 
Epistemic communities are defined and delineated by the generation and maintenance of 
shared coding schemes (vocabulary, codes) and cognitive frames (theories, mental maps) 
that help the community and its members define and solve problems and ‘get the job 
done’ (Håkanson, 2003). Communities are also characterized by their inherited technol-
ogy, much of which is typically embedded in physical artifacts of various kinds. 
 
DATA ACTIONCODES
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FIGURE 1. The Functional Elements of Epistemic Communities 
      (adapted from Daft and Weick 1984). 
 
                                                 
5 In some accounts (Amin and Cohendet, 2004, pp. 74-78), ‘epistemic communities’ are defined as 
communities of practice engaged in deliberate knowledge creation. However, for the present purpose, that 
distinction is not so important since – to various degrees – all communities of practice engage in learning 
and knowledge creation – both by deliberate intention and by accident (Lave and Wenger, 1991).     
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The capabilities of a community, i.e. the range and efficiency of the tasks it can perform, 
are determined by the dynamic interaction of these three elements, here labeled codes, 
theory, and tools (Figure 1). I use the concepts broadly. Thus ‘codes’ refer to all symbolic 
means, through which the community communicates with its environment and its mem-
bers with one another, including both ordinary language and more specialized varieties, 
such as mathematics, chemical formulae or computer code – and pictorial representa-
tions (graphs, maps, diagrams and pictures, etc.).6 ‘Theory’ refers to the cognitive frames 
that help it interpret and make sense of the messages.7 It includes tacit cultural elements 
and ‘mental maps’ but also formal theoretical models of the causalities deemed relevant 
to the practice. ‘Tools’, finally, is used to denote the physical artifacts that the 
community employs in the execution of its tasks or the development of its knowledge, 
including its physical “memory”, i.e. the records and artifacts in which its experience has 
been codified or embodied and on which it can draw in performing its tasks.                          
 
Some codes, some theories and the use of some tools are generally learnt as part of a 
typical primary school curriculum, for example the rules and conventions of writing the 
local language and the skills of using a pencil. The mastery of others is specific to par-
ticular epistemic communities and is acquired through a combination of advanced general 
education, specialized training programs, apprenticeship or trial-and-error experiential 
learning in actual practice. They include both tacit elements and explicit cognitive sche-
mata, ranging from simple rules of thumb to explicit scientific theory. 
  
                                                 
6 One of the things required of new members of a community is the mastery of the local language: 
“[K]nowing how to act within a domain of action is learning how to make competent use of the categories 
and the distinctions constituting that domain… [To] engage in collective work is to engage in a discursive 
practice, namely in the normative use of a sign system which is directed at influencing aspects of the world 
and whose key categories and distinctions are defined through their use in discourse” (Tsoukas and 
Vladimirou 2001, p. 978). However, as White (1990) has pointed out, effective use of language also 
requires (generally tacit) agreement as to what level of imprecision is acceptable: “Part of maintaining a 
community is maintaining the agreement not to speak or ask about the ways in which its language means 
differently to for different members. And those differences can be so enormous that in listening to the talk 
one is often surprised that it can go on at all.” (White 1990, p. 36 in Weick 1995, p. 107) 
7 Cognition is the most socially-conditioned activity of man, and knowledge is the paramount social 
creation. The very structure of language presents a compelling philosophy characteristic of that community, 
and even a single word can represent a complex theory…. every epistemological theory is trivial that does 
not take the sociological dependence of all cognition into account in a fundamental and detailed manner.” 
(Fleck 1935, p. 42 in Douglas 1987, p. 12) 
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KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
For a considerable time, the organization and management literatures were dominated by 
a rather mechanistic model of language and communication, inspired by the pioneering 
work of Shannon and Weaver (1949). As summarized by Boland and Tenkasi, the 
associated ‘conduit model’ of communication suggests that … 
… communication can be improved by reducing noise in the channel, with noise 
defined as the possibility for error of contaminating the message on its route from 
sender to receiver. Noise can be reduced by increasing the channel capacity; by 
refining the procedures for encoding and decoding messages; by providing more 
reliable storage and retrieval facilities; or by making the channel of communica-
tion more universally available. (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995, p. 352)  
This ‘information processing’ perspective of communication assumes the existence of 
shared codes and syntax and that the meanings to be conveyed can be expressed as codi-
fied messages. These assumptions have been all but abandoned in current literature, 
where a view of knowledge is often adopted, which emphasizes the importance of non-
codified, ‘tacit’ knowledge over more explicit varieties.8 ‘Tacit knowledge’, it is as-
sumed, is ‘sticky’ and difficult to transfer; however, once it has been codified, there is 
nothing to prevent its rapid and near costless diffusion.  
 
Although the possibilities and incentives to codify knowledge are frequently underesti-
mated, the recognition that not all knowledge can be communicated in codified form is a 
valid and important one. However, the assumption that there are no barriers to the trans-
fer and diffusion of codified knowledge is seriously misleading.  It abstracts from the 
critical fact that meaningful transfer of even the simplest piece of information requires 
that the recipient masters the code in which it is expressed and can apply a theoretical 
frame relevant to its interpretation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 
                                                 
8 Although their objectives and emphases differ, the parallel and overlapping theoretical developments of 
the ‘knowledge-based’ approach to the theory of the firm (Kogut and Zander 1992; 1993, 1996; Grant, 
1996a, 1996b) and that of the ‘resource-based view’ on strategy (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; 1991, 
Peteraf, 1994) have been associated with a broad convergence regarding the way in which ‘knowledge’ – a 
central concept in both streams of literature – is conceived. Influenced by theoretical advancements in the 
sociology of knowledge and organizational theory (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Orr, 1996; Brown & Duguid, 
1991; 1998), this consensus include basic assumptions as to the ‘social’ and ‘path-dependent’ nature of 
knowledge, the economic and strategic significance of ‘tacit’ as opposed to ‘articulated’ knowledge, the 
conditions favoring or obstructing the ‘flow’ of codified as compared to tacit knowledge, etc.  
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1998). It therefore ignores the problems associated with the mobilization, coordination 
and integration of specialized functional knowledge, as required in the operations of most 
organizations.  
 
Conversely, the current emphasis on the situational and personal aspects of tacit knowl-
edge has tended to obscure the fact that tacit knowledge can be ‘shared’ in the sense that 
people that have undergone the same experiential learning process will master the same 
tacit skills (Boisot, 1995; Sanchez, 1997). It therefore underestimates the potential for 
imitation and involuntary transfer of knowledge within epistemic communities. 
 
While communication of knowledge between people belonging to the same community 
who share a common vocabulary, methods of practice and tacit skills is generally 
unproblematic, knowledge transfer between individuals belonging to different communi-
ties is often difficult, time consuming and expensive (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995). Fortu-
nately, cooperation, coordination and joint action between the various occupational 
specialists of a firm do not require that each acquire the knowledge of the other. As Grant 
(1996a, p. 114) emphasizes, “… transferring knowledge is not an efficient approach to 
integrating knowledge.”  This is a key insight, the consequences of which will be 
elaborated below; a primary reason for the existence of firms is that they provide the 
means for knowledge integration and coordinated action without requiring people of 
different occupational backgrounds to share or understand each others’ knowledge and 
world views.  
  
Knowledge Transfer within Epistemic Communities 
Members of the same epistemic community tend to have similar backgrounds in terms of 
formal training and job experience. They interpret their common practice in similar ways 
and share mastery of its tools. These commonalities are not limited to explicit aspects; 
engagement in the same practice provides similar types of experiential or tacit knowl-
edge. In consequence, knowledge transfer between individual members of the same 
epistemic community can often be accomplished with relative ease regardless of their 
geographical location or organizational memberships (Figure 2). Indeed, within epistemic 
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communities, the communication of articulated knowledge rendered in standardized code 
can usefully be analyzed largely as an information processing problem, with emphasis on 
the existence of shared syntax (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; Carlile, 2002).9
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FIGURE 2.  Transfer of Articulated Knowledge within Epistemic Communities 
 
 
Whereas the transfer of codified knowledge within a community can take place with ease 
regardless of the distance between sender and receiver, tacit knowledge elements can 
only be acquired through personal experience, often over long periods. This generally 
requires some form of master-apprentice relationship or on-the-job training and is there-
fore dependent on geographical proximity between the learner and her master and/or 
place of work.  
 
Although tacit knowledge is, by definition, rooted in the personal experience of the indi-
vidual, members of the same epistemic community have been exposed to the same type 
of experience. The tacit knowledge that it provides is therefore not private but shared 
                                                 
9 There is a caveat to this proposition: Differences in language and syntax exist not only between different 
epistemic communities but also within them, as local groups of practitioners develop idiosyncratic coding 
schemes (Allen 1977). These enhance the efficiency of communication among community members but 
impede communication with ‘outsiders’. Like other aspects of organizational culture, local codes tend to be 
taken for granted and their mastery is largely tacit. Idiosyncratic codes frequently aggravate the problem of 
communication across organizational boundaries: “There is a great deal of overlap among the coding 
schemes of different organizations operating within the same culture. On the other hand, the nonoverlap-
ping areas, however small, can potentially operate to produce semantic noise, and they can be even more 
troublesome because it can go undetected” (Allen 1977, p. 139). However, although oftentimes frustrating 
when they are encountered, the significance of these types of communication barriers should not be 
exaggerated.  
 
 10
within the community, whose members are sometimes geographically widely dispersed 
(Amin and Cohendet, 2004. Hence, even when the knowledge applied in the production 
of a particular artifact is highly tacit, this may not prevent its (perhaps involuntary) 
diffusion. Contrary to a common assumption, the ease of imitation is not so much de-
pendent on the degree of articulation of the knowledge in question as on the extent to 
which the relevant epistemic community extends beyond the boundaries of individual 
firms or geographical localities.  In many industries, also ones characterized by highly 
tacit knowledge and practices, the mere demonstration that a particular product design is 
feasible, as evidenced in a functioning physical product or other artifact, is sufficient to 
induce and permit rapid imitation (Figure 3).10
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FIGURE 3.  Transfer of Knowledge through Products, Machines and Other Artifacts 
 
 
Being incidental to their primary purpose, the knowledge embodied in artifacts often has 
strong tacit elements.11 Nevertheless, an observer belonging to the relevant epistemic 
community and versed in the appropriate practice can often through observation and 
reverse engineering ‘decode’ the artifact and lay bare the knowledge used in its design 
and production. 
                                                 
10 Such imitation need not imply a one-to-one correspondence in capabilities. As Zander (1994, p. 22) 
notes, “... imitation does not require the exact copying of existing know-how... innovations can be 
introduced and manufactured in different ways.” 
11 As most users of personal computers can testify, acquisition of an artifact can increase the capabilities of 
the acquirer also without transfer of the underlying cognitive elements. Indeed, in many instances, such 
understanding may be irrelevant for the user whose primary interest is the application of the artifact and 
who may be totally ignorant of the theoretical principles employed in its design and production. 
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 Knowledge Transfer between Epistemic Communities 
Within epistemic communities, codified knowledge can be communicated as ‘informa-
tion.’ It is “...alienable from the person who wrote the code” and “...can be transmitted 
without loss of integrity once the syntactical rules required for deciphering it are known.” 
(Kogut and Zander 1992, p. 386 f.) Transfer of codified information is unproblematic as 
long as the recipient is in possession of the code required to decipher the message and the 
theoretical frames that give it meaning. However, like the knowledge they express, many 
codes are specific to certain epistemic communities, reflecting the nature of their practice 
and their beliefs and values:12  
Scientific disciplines observe semantic traditions and meanings that vary between 
their respective contexts. Thus “…interpretation and understanding of scientific 
concepts is only possible by referring to the specific ‘community’ – together with 
the historical and sociological conditioning of that community – which has pro-
duced it.” (Zolo 1989, p. 170 in Lane and Lubatkin 1998, p. 464) 
The existence of an explicit and well-defined code does not by itself guarantee the effi-
cient transfer of information. It also requires that the recipient be familiar with it and with 
the underlying theoretical perspective, which it expresses. If not, he/she must invest in 
learning the code of the message and the theory to which it refers. This requires con-
scious and costly effort and will only be undertaken if the perceived gain is high enough. 
Transfer of knowledge between epistemic communities is therefore cumbersome, expen-
sive and prone to failure. This is evidenced not only by the overall dismal experience of 
technology transfer programs to developing countries; in the strategy literature, the same 
phenomenon is reflected in the important concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Zahra and George, 2002). 
  
                                                 
12 Already in the 19th century, the different practices and associated value systems of scientists and 
engineers were reflected in the codes employed. ”In the physical sciences the highest prestige went to the 
most abstract and general – that is to the mathematical theorists from Newton to Einstein. Instrumentation 
and application generally ranked lowest. In the technological community the successful designer or builder 
ranked highest, the “mere” theorist the lowest… These values influence not only the status of occupational 
specialists, but the nature of the work done and the ‘language’ in which that work is expressed” (Layton 
1971, pp. 576 ff.). 
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KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION 
The day-to-day operations of most firms would be hopelessly unmanageable if coordi-
nated action between members of different occupations required that each acquire the 
knowledge of every other. Fortunately, this is not the case. Rules and directives, planned 
sequencing of activities and standard routines help firms economize on communication 
and knowledge transfer (Grant, 1996a, pp. 114 f.).  Indeed, quite complex organizational 
routines operate on the simple basis that the output of some specialized activity provides 
the cue for the next to start (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
 
Even activities involving higher order forms of interdependence (Thompson, 1967), such 
as new product development and other unstructured problem solving, can be accom-
plished without the participants to the endeavor mastering the skills of one another. How-
ever, a mode of interaction must be established that permits knowledge of specialized 
communities to be integrated with one another (Grant, 1996a). As elaborated by Boland 
and Tenkasi (1995), mechanisms must be found that enable communities to overcome the 
degree of incommensurability of their specialized vocabularies, instruments and theories 
without sacrificing their respective integrity and distinctiveness. Successful knowledge 
integration is characterized by a “process of perspective taking in which the perspective 
of another can be taken into account as part of a community’s way of knowing” (Boland 
and Tenkasi, 1995, p. 356).       
 
The Role of ‘Common Knowledge’ 
Knowledge integration does not take place in a void. As Grant (1996a, p. 115 f.) empha-
sizes, it depends on the existence of ‘common knowledge,’ including not only  common 
language and mastery of basic symbolic means of expression (literacy, numeracy, famili-
arity with standard software, etc.), but also other shared meanings, mutual “recognition of 
individual knowledge domains” and awareness of available knowledge repertoires. The 
existence of a common knowledge infrastructure is an important prerequisite for efficient 
knowledge integration. Its strengthening through company-wide training programs and 
the nurturing of organizational cultures is an important means to increase the 
effectiveness of collaborative communication. 
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However, knowledge integration and ‘perspective taking’ – both routine activities 
(Bechky, 2003a, 2003b) and in infrequent and complex tasks, such as those associated 
with the development of new products (Carlile, 2002), – also rely on more specific 
mechanisms. In the literature, two main such mechanisms have been identified: 
boundary-spanning individuals and boundary objects.     
 
Boundary-Spanning Individuals  
‘Boundary-spanning individuals’ (Vincenti, 1990, p. 84), ‘translators’ (Brown & Duguid, 
1998, p. 103) or ‘knowledge brokers’ (Wenger, 1998, p. 104 ff.) are individuals who 
belong to more than one community and who are therefore able to translate knowledge 
generated in one community into a form intelligible to the participants in another (Figure 
4). These are typically people 
…who have themselves moved across the relevant inter-institutional, interna-
tional, interfunctional or interdisciplinary divides, and thereby learned to think in 
the languages and cultures of the other side… It would be rare indeed to obtain 
the required knowledge, culture or language skills – say, simply by reading rele-
vant cultural/linguistic grammars or guidebooks – without face-to-face personal 
interactions” (Hoch, 1990, p. 342).  
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FIGURE 4. Knowledge Integration through Boundary-Spanning Individuals 
 
 
However, ‘deep’ professional skills of this kind take a long time to develop, typically a 
decade or more and most people therefore acquire expertise only in one area (Simon, 
1981). Hence, boundary-spanning individuals are in short supply and their employment 
can be quite costly.      
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Boundary Objects  
But there are also less expensive ways of achieving coordination. Recent research has 
noted the importance of boundary objects (Carlile, 2002; Bechky, 2003; Star, 1989; 
1993), i.e. “…objects that both inhabit several communities of practice and satisfy the 
informational requirements of each of them. In working practice, they are objects that are 
able both to across borders and maintain some sort of constant identity” (Bowker and Star 
1999, p. 16) (Figure 5). They are significant because they facilitate coordinated action 
without requiring members of different communities to align their understanding of each 
other’s knowledge:  
Perspective-taking is never a one-to-one mapping of meanings. Members of the 
same community of knowing will not have full consensus, and members of differ-
ent communities cannot simply adopt the meaning of another. … [B]oundary 
objects do not convey unambiguous meaning, but have instead a sort of symbolic 
adequacy that enables conversation without enforcing commonly shared mean-
ings. (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995, p. 362)  
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THEORY
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FIGURE 5. Knowledge Integration through Boundary Objects 
 
Modern computer and information systems are pervasive examples of boundary objects. 
Their effects are important not only because they facilitate integration and new combina-
tions of knowledge, but also because they create inducements to articulate knowledge in 
standardized code.13 Many boundary objects benefit from simultaneous physical 
                                                 
13 Kogut and Zander (2003, p. 513) relate the story of how a common CAD system acted as a catalyst in 
enabling a Swedish MNC to achieve the degree of global product standardization that its U.S. subsidiary 
had for almost a decade successfully resisted. (Probably to avoid offending the sensibilities of JIBS’ 
American readership, Kogut and Zander portray the story as involving a French subsidiary – the French 
being notorious for their refusal to accept the wisdom of other nations, witness the country’s position on the 
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manifestation. This is often the case with drawings, prototypes and physical products – 
probably the simplest, but commonest and most pervasive forms of boundary objects 
(Bechky, 2003a).  
          
Not every artifact can function as a boundary object. Effective boundary objects, Carlile 
(2002) suggests, help overcome language barriers and differences in coding systems by 
facilitating the establishment of common syntax – often  by way of simple physical 
demonstration (‘show-how’). They also help overcome differences in theoretical 
perspectives by providing a means for individuals to express what they know as 
concretely as possible. If successful, boundary objects can help in the process of 
‘perspective taking’, in which a community recognizes the expertise of another as an 
element of importance to its own practice. The process is often facilitated when a 
boundary object artifact or its representation can be physically transformed in response to 
negotiated changes in meaning.     
 
KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE AND GOVERNANCE 
Firms consist of a multitude of epistemic communities, each with its own vocabulary, set 
of theories and tools (Brown and Duguid, 1991). This, as Amin and Cohendet, (2004, p. 
xiv) note, creates 
… a new governance problem… concerning how the division of work (which 
distributes functions and duties between actors) and the division of knowledge 
(which distributes the capacity of interpretation and learning between these 
actors) within firms can be aligned. 
 
In order to achieve effective cooperation among its various communities and subcultures, 
firms need to undertake investments in boundary-spanning mechanisms.14 These include 
                                                                                                                                                 
war on Iraq.) While the story of the subsidiary’s stubborn refusal to conform to a Swedish way of 
engineering is difficult to reconcile with the idea that “firms specialize in the internal transfer of tacit 
knowledge” (Kogut and Zander, 1993, p. 625), it does illustrate the vital role of boundary objects in 
bridging the epistemic communities of firms.   
14 Kogut and Zander (1996) suggest that ‘identification’ ensures that individuals act in line with the 
objectives of the firm. In contrast, the literature on the sociology of knowledge tends to assume that people 
identify more closely with the more specialized communities from which they derive their professional or 
occupational roles. In this case, it is the objective of the hierarchy to provide appropriate incentive schemes. 
Whatever the approach, however, a theory of the firm should attend not only to the incentives for 
cooperation but also the conditions that enable it to take place. 
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the establishment of an organizational infrastructure, including a broad area of common 
knowledge among members and a recognized delineation of occupational (and 
individual) knowledge domains (Bechky, 2003a). They also include the identification and 
employment of knowledge-spanning individuals and the establishment of boundary 
objects, both intentional ones, such as a budget and cost accounting system, and ones that 
are incidental to other purposes, e.g. drawings, prototypes and final products. These 
investments are specific to the context in which they take place and to the transactions 
that they facilitate and are therefore subject to the familiar risks of opportunism and hold-
up (Williamson 1975; 1985). The need for such investments therefore determines the 
boundaries of the entrepreneurial firm (Alvarez and Barney, 2004) and influences also 
those of firms in later stages of development.   
 
It is important to note that dedicated, firm-specific mechanisms for knowledge integration 
arise not from the ‘tacitness’ of the expertise employed but from the partial incom-
mensurability of the knowledge entertained by the different epistemic communities, on  
whose joint efforts the activities of firms depend.  There is no reason to assume that firms 
are more privileged in the integration of tacit knowledge than of more explicit varieties. 
Firms are institutions for integrating both tacit and explicit knowledge (Grant 1996a, 
1996b). 
 
Effort and investments in knowledge integrating mechanisms will only be undertaken in 
the expectation of benefits exceeding the associated costs. As Alvarez and Barney (2004) 
emphasize, the organization of rent generation must therefore be examined 
simultaneously with that of rent appropriation, an issue that resource-based theory has yet 
to effectively address. It is not a rare occurrence, for example, that a firm chooses to 
license its technology to a larger competitor whose existing marketing organization 
allows it to generate sales on a larger scale and more rapidly than the owner of the 
technology could.  
 
Because of the associated uncertainty and ambiguity, the completion of agreements 
involving the sale of tacit or incompletely codified knowledge is difficult. The desire to 
 17
complete a licensing agreement therefore provides a powerful incentive to invest in the 
articulation and codification of the technologies involved. Technologies licensed to third 
parties are therefore, on average, more completely codified than those exploited 
internally.15  
 
KNOWLEDGE BASED COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
The ‘resource-based view’ of strategy is based on the remarkably trivial observation that 
in order to do something successfully (such as staying in business), you need the skills to 
do whatever it is that you would like to do and you need to possess the physical resources 
necessary for the activity in question. In order to be more successful than others (earning 
above-normal profits), emulation of your skill by others and/or the acquisition of the 
required resources must be difficult. Following the influential conjecture by Winter 
(1987), much current literature has focused on the advantages conferred by skills based 
on ‘tacit’ knowledge which, it is now generally assumed, are difficult or impossible to 
imitate. 
 
Implicit in this argument – although this is rarely spelled out – is the assumption that tacit 
knowledge in is both ‘rare’ and difficult to imitate. But as argued above, much tacit 
knowledge is common to all practitioners of a particular trade or occupation and is 
therefore not rare. Moreover, among such practitioners, new skills can often be emulated 
with relative ease. The ‘absorptive capacity’ possessed by members of an epistemic 
community of knowledge created by their peers is typically high. This helps to explain 
Zander’s and Kogut’s (1995) finding that the hazard of imitation of manufacturing 
technologies is independent of their degree of tacitness and supports their conclusion that 
“… the view of capability transfer and imitation as mirror phenomena needs to be 
refined. (p. 85).  
                                                 
15 In an influential argument, Kogut and Zander (1993) suggested a causal relationship between a 
technology’s degree of codification and the probability that its transfer to foreign countries will take place 
to a third party rather than to a wholly-owned subsidiary. In their empirical test of this hypothesis, the 
characteristics of a technology (i.e. its degree of tacitness) at the time of measurement (1989) is used to 
explain decisions regarding the mode of its foreign exploitation that were made, in some cases, two or three 
decades earlier. The argument advanced here implies a less unconventional concept of causality. 
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 There may certainly be instances where the prevailing assumption regarding the 
imitability of tacit knowledge holds true. As a rule, however, competitive advantage is 
not created by the possession of tacit knowledge in individual functions or activities. It 
accrues to firms that manage to integrate the knowledge of their epistemic communities 
in a more efficient way than do their competitors. Such integrative capabilities are often 
both tacit and idiosyncratic to organizational context and are therefore difficult to imitate.      
  
CONCLUSION 
Firms gain competitive advantage, first, by accessing and nurturing the epistemic com-
munities where critical knowledge is available or is being created, and, second, by their 
ability to integrate this knowledge with that of other communities (Teece, 1998). The 
question as to whether or not – or to what extent – knowledge has been codified into 
fixed, standardized form is only one aspect of its ease of dissemination. The members of 
epistemic communities master both the tacit and the explicit aspects of their practice. A 
richer understanding of the determinants and effects of (voluntary) replication and (invol-
untary) imitation requires that a distinction be made between the conditions that influence 
the knowledge integration between epistemic communities, on the one hand, and those 
that affect knowledge transfer within such communities, on the other.  
 
Recognizing that the determinants and the costs of these different forms of knowledge 
exchange are fundamentally different throws important light on the existence and 
boundaries of firms: Firms exist because they have a relative advantage in the integration 
of diverse knowledge; superior such ability may confer competitive advantage because it 
is difficult to imitate.  
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